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IFS AND BUTS IN CHARTER
ADJUDICATION: THE UNRULY
EMERGENCE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL
EXEMPTIONS IN CANADA
Morris Rosenberg*
Stéphane Perrault**

The idea of “constitutional exemptions” is not new to the Canadian legal
landscape. Starting with Big M Drug Mart1 in 1985, the suggestion that one
could claim constitutional exemption from the application of a statute has
floated around and was in fact acted upon by several lower courts. But, for a
number of years, the idea of constitutional exemptions was approached with
great reservation by the Supreme Court of Canada, which seemed well aware of
the potential implications of accepting such a remedy. In the last year and a
half, however, this prudent awareness appears to have given way to some tacit
acceptance of the idea that individuals may be relieved from the application of
an otherwise perfectly valid law. In several recent cases, the Court has referred
to constitutional exemptions using language that seems to assume the existence
of such remedy, or at least language that was not accompanied by the Court’s
usual reservations. This is a matter of concern given the importance of the issue
not only with respect to remedies but also its implications for judicial review
and the rule of law in Canada.
The Canadian jurisprudence points to two distinct types of exemptions. The
first and less controversial one is a limited or, as we shall refer to it in this
paper, “ancillary” exemption. This may occur when a piece of legislation is
struck down, but the declaration of invalidity is suspended in order to give
Parliament or the legislatures time to respond. During the period of suspension,
an exemption may be granted such as to relieve the successful Charter2 claimant from either the past or continued application of the statute. In a sense, this is
an exemption from the effect of the suspension and is merely ancillary to that.
The second and much more controversial type of exemption is a stand alone
remedy granted on a case-by-case basis where a court finds that a piece of

* Morris Rosenberg is Deputy Minister at the Department of Justice of Canada.
** Stéphane Perrault is counsel at the Human Rights Law Section of the same Department.
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not of the Department.
1
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [hereinafter Big M Drug Mart].
2
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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legislation is generally valid but that it has an unconstitutional effect on a particular applicant. This type of exemption allows the courts to avoid invalidating
or interfering with the wording of a statutory provision, while at the same time
refusing to apply it in the circumstances of a particular case. We shall refer to
these as “remedial” exemptions.
This paper will examine some of the ramifications of constitutional exemptions for judicial review in Canada. The first part of the paper shows how remedial exemptions reflect a particular understanding of the role of the courts as
guardians of the Constitution that is more consistent with the American tradition of judicial review, but is at odds with fundamental aspects of the Canadian
approach to Charter adjudication. In the second part, we argue that the recognition of constitutional exemptions in Canada would imply an important deterioration of the “rule of law” as we have come to understand it and cause
significant problems, not just theoretical but also practical, particularly in the
application of the criminal law.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTIONS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
To cast the debate over constitutional exemptions as one that is concerned
strictly with remedies is misleading. The old proposition according to which
“rights follow remedies” still carries much truth. The existence or the absence
of individualized Charter remedies to statutory infirmities is one that has profound implications on the manner in which Charter claims are made and adjudicated. It affects matters of standing, defines the scope of a court’s inquiry and
the extent of the government’s burden to justify statutory interferences with
protected rights and freedoms. Underlying the debate over constitutional exemptions is a debate over the manner and scope of judicial review under the
Charter.
1. Exemptive Remedies and Judicial Review in the United States
It is fair to assume that the controversy surrounding remedial exemptions in
Canada would come as somewhat of a surprise to an observing American lawyer. In the United States, “facial invalidity” — i.e., what we refer to in Canada
as “striking down” — is the exception. Only in rare cases will U.S. courts find
that a statute or a particular provision is “facially” invalid — that is, invalid in
all of its applications, leading to a declaration of general invalidity.
The normal course in which constitutional disputes are resolved in the U.S.
is through the operation of the doctrine of “as applied invalidity”. Under this
doctrine, a statutory provision that produces unconstitutional effects “as applied” to a litigant in a particular case will simply not be enforced by the courts
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in that case, but will otherwise remain in force. The doctrine of “as applied
invalidity” may result in judicial pronouncements that more or less clearly
suggest that a certain class of persons, beyond the litigants, will not be subject
to the impugned provision. Nonetheless, this is a matter of being able to predict
how the courts will respond to similar situations in the future; it is not the result
of a formal remedy directed at a class of persons, as is the case when Canadian
courts use “reading in” or “reading down” to remedy an offending provision. A
good example is perhaps the famous case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,3 where a
compulsory school attendance law was held by the United States Supreme
Court not to apply to members of the Amish faith on the ground that this interfered with religious freedom. This effectively amounted to a remedial exemption for the Amish community.
The American preference for the case-by-case approach of “as applied invalidity” is reflected in numerous facets of judicial review, ranging from issues of
standing to the manner in which court decisions are articulated.
In the U.S., strict standing rules generally prevent a litigant from invoking
factual situations other than his own in order to demonstrate that a law is
impermissibly vague or overbroad. According to the U.S. Supreme Court:
Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be
heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court. […] A closely related principle is that constitutional rights are personal and may not be asserted
vicariously. […] These principles rest on more than the fussiness of judges. They
reflect the conviction that under our constitutional system courts are not roving
commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation’s laws. […]
Constitutional judgments, as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall recognized, are justified
only out of the necessity of adjudicating rights in particular cases between the litigants brought before the Court […].4

Indeed, the foundations of American judicial review, as originally articulated
in Marbury v. Madison,5 are based on a pragmatic necessity for the courts to
choose between conflicting norms in resolving concrete disputes. In Marbury,
Chief Justice Marshall thus asked (somewhat rhetorically):
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution
apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably
to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disre-

3
4
5

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, at 610-11 (1973).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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garding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs
the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution and the constitution is superior to
any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act must
govern the case to which they both apply. 6

Almost two centuries later, the issue in the flag burning case of Texas v.
Johnson was therefore not whether a statute could validly prohibit the desecration of the flag despite the First Amendment protection of free speech but, as
articulated by Justice Brennan, “whether the State’s interest in preserving the
flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity justifies Johnson’s conviction”.7 Having found that it could not justify Johnson’s conviction, the Court
expressed no need to consider whether the statute could validly apply in other
situations or whether it should be declared unconstitutional.
There is thus in the United States a clear and deeply rooted connection between the foundations of judicial review, the limitations on standing and recourse to “as applied invalidity”.
This is not to say that in the U.S. statutes are never struck down, or that the
courts never look to factual situations beyond that of the litigants before them
in order to resolve issues arising under the Bill of Rights. Indeed, free speech
jurisprudence recognizes that a provision that restricts speech may be declared
“facially invalid” if it is found substantially overbroad based on its application
to hypothetical situations.8 Such a statute will be struck down, in whole or in
part, unless it can be cured through judicial “reconstruction”.9 However, a
statute will not be found facially overbroad where its impermissible applications “although substantial in absolute number, [are] insubstantial when com-

6

Id., at 178.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, at 410 (1989).
8
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The application of the overbreadth doctrine recently resulted in the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down portions of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act that prohibited the possession of, inter alia, any visual depiction that “appears to
be” of a minor engaged in sexual activity, whether or not the depiction contravenes community
standards and despite the fact that the material may have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value: Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, U.S. S. Ct. No. 00795 (April 16, 2002).
9
In Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990), for example, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a
State prohibition on the possession of child pornography. The provision captured material “that
shows a minor who is not the person’s child or ward in a state of nudity”, subject to specific exceptions. However, the provision had been construed by the Ohio Supreme Court as reading: “that
shows a minor who is not the person’s child or ward in a state of nudity, where such nudity constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic focus on the genitals”. The U.S. Supreme Court found
that the provision, as construed by the lower court, was constitutionally permissible.
7
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pared to the law’s legitimate application”.10 According to the U.S. Supreme
Court, facial overbreadth is “strong medecine” that is to be applied “sparingly
and only as a last resort”.11
The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine thus provides limited exceptions
to ordinary standing rules, allowing a party to rely on fact situations other than
his or her own. It is worth pointing out that the rationale given for this relaxation of the standing rules — namely that sweeping legislation may have a
“chilling effect” on speech — only makes full sense in light of the ordinary
preference for “as applied invalidity”. It is indeed largely because of the caseby-case aspect of judicial review under the “as applied invalidity” doctrine that
overly broad legislation can have a chilling effect on speech, since under this
approach individuals who are not party to the litigation lack sufficient certainty
as to reassure them that their expressive activities will also receive judicial
protection.
It is not surprising that, by contrast, “chilling effect” has not in Canada been
much of a buzzword in freedom of expression jurisprudence. This follows
naturally from the fact that Charter adjudication in Canada is a significantly
different exercise, governed by different rules and premised on a different
understanding of judicial review.
2. Exemptive Remedies and Judicial Review in Canada
Canadian courts have only in the last 20 years embarked on judicial review
based on constitutionally protected rights and freedoms. Before the Charter
came into force, however, the judicial function in Canada had already distinguished itself from its American counterpart.
Noteworthy in this regard is the recognition in 1912 that the Supreme Court
of Canada could properly give opinions on abstract issues of law referred to it
by the Governor General in Council. 12 The previous year, the United States
Supreme Court had refused similar jurisdiction on the ground that the Constitution invested the courts only with jurisdiction over “cases” and “controversies”
and that the power to pronounce on constitutional matters could only be exer10

Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2nd ed., 1988), at 1025, commenting on Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, supra, note 4. The decision in Broadrick dealt with a rule limiting political activities of
civil service employees. Despite its sweeping terms, the court refused to strike the provision. That
decision stands in sharp contrast with the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Osborne v.
Canada (Treasury Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69, where a similar rule was struck down on the basis
that it was over-inclusive.
11
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra, note 4, at 613.
12
Re References by Governor General-in-Council (1910), 43 S.C.R. 536; aff’d. [1912] A.C.
571 (sub nom. Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for Canada).

380

Supreme Court Law Review

(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d)

cised, as expressed in Marbury v. Madison, in the course of “pronouncing
judgment between the parties to a case”.13 This greater openness of Canadian
courts to entertain abstract issues of law became manifest in early Charter
jurisprudence. Early landmark cases like Hunter v. Southam,14 in 1984, and R.
v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,15 in 1985, paved the way to a conception of the role
of the courts as guardians of the Constitution that did not simply amount to the
narrow resolution of concrete disputes, but rather had the courts pronouncing
on the law in a much more general way.
In Hunter v. Southam Inc.,16 which remains the guiding decision on section 8
search and seizure protection, the Supreme Court departed from American
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by holding that for a search to be reasonable
it must be authorized by law and the law must be reasonable. These requirements mean that Canadian courts are not simply to look at the reasonableness
of a particular search, but must also pronounce on the general validity of the
legal regime authorizing the search. In that case, as for example in the subsequent case of Baron v. R.,17 the searches themselves may have been perfectly
reasonable, but the regimes were not and could, in hypothetical situations, lead
to unreasonable searches. For that reason, they were struck down.
The following year, in Big M Drug Mart, the Court held that in a prosecution
for the violation of a Sunday observance law a corporation has standing to
challenge the law based on freedom of religion. The issue, according to the
Court, was not whether the accused corporation could exercise the right to
freedom of religion (which it arguably does not possess) but rather whether it
could be convicted for violating an unconstitutional statute. The Court was
concerned not with upholding the personal rights of the accused, nor did it see
its role merely as the arbiter of an isolated dispute. In its view, s. 52 of the
Constitution Act, 198218 required that invalid laws not be given effect, and
therefore that its role was to pronounce on the general validity of the impugned
provision independently of the particular facts of the case. 19
13

Muskrat v. U. S., 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
(sub nom. Canada (Director of Investigation & Research, Combines Investigation
Branch), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
15
Supra, note 1.
16
Supra, note 14.
17
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 416.
18
Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
19
A similar approach is taken by the South African Constitutional Court, as illustrated by the
recent decision in Islamic Community Convention v. Independent Broadcasting Authority, CCT
36/01, April 11 2002. The case arose from a complaint regarding a radio broadcast that was considered to constitute hate speech contrary to clause 2(a) of the Code of Conduct for Broadcasting
Services in that it was “likely to prejudice […] relations between sections of the population.” The
issue was whether this clause was inconsistent with freedom of expression under s. 16 of the South
14
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Big M Drug Mart opened wide the door to the use of reasonable hypotheticals, either in the context of deciding whether a substantive Charter right is
infringed — for example, regarding section 12 protection against cruel and
unusual punishment, as illustrated by R. v. Smith20 — or in the context of section 1, particularly with respect to discussions of overbreadth, as illustrated by
the more recent case of Sharpe21 on child pornography.
In Canada, this extensive use of reasonable hypotheticals, unfettered by issues of standing, allows for a fulsome scrutiny of a provision’s validity in light
of myriad possible applications — contrasting in this regard with the much
more restrained American tradition of judicial review and reducing the necessity or the appeal of exemptive remedies.
Interestingly, Big M Drug Mart is the first case to make any reference to the
possibility of constitutional exemptions. The issue was raised by Dickson C.J.
in cursory fashion in a discussion of standing. This should not come as a surprise, given the close nexus between issues of standing, the scope of judicial
review and individualized remedies. Nor is it surprising that Dickson C.J. did
not dwell on the matter of individual exemptions, given the direction taken by
the Court on the issue of standing.
Constitutional exemptions were first given clear judicial recognition in 1987
by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Seaboyer,22 dealing with the “rape-shield”
provision of the Criminal Code.23 All five judges found the provision to violate
the Charter on the ground that it could, in some cases, compromise trial fairness.
A three-judge majority, however, chose not to strike down the provision but
rather leave it to future judges to grant exemptions on a case-by-case basis where
required to comply with the Charter. While the reasoning of the majority was
based on a view that the application of the provision would be constitutionally
problematic only in relatively rare circumstances and that it would be extremely

African Constitution which specifically excludes “advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm” [s. 16(2)(c)]. In deciding the
matter, the Constitutional Court paid no regard to the actual content of the broadcast, but merely
considered the impugned provision. It stated in this regard (para. 21):
Although the matter has its origins in the complaint by the Board in respect of a specific broadcast, the function of this Court in the present proceedings is to adjudicate on the
question of the constitutionality of clause 2(a) of the Code in relation to that complaint as an
abstract and objective one. The contents of the particular statement in respect of which the
Board complains are not relevant to the enquiry. What the Court is concerned with is
whether the provision on which the complaint was based is consistent with the right to freedom of expression in section 16 of the Constitution” [emphasis added].
20
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045.
21
R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, discussed below.
22
R. v. Seaboyer (1987), 61 O.R. (2d) 290 (C.A.).
23
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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difficult for Parliament to devise an exhaustive list of exceptions, it is telling that
the majority also relied heavily on American jurisprudence under the Bill of
Rights in support of the appropriateness of constitutional exemptions.
Other Canadian courts followed thereafter. In 1989, the British Columbia
Court of Appeal held in R. v. Chief 24 that the mandatory firearms prohibition of
the Criminal Code could, in the case of trappers such as the accused, amount to
a cruel and unusual punishment. Rather than striking down the provision, which
the Court found to be appropriate with respect to the vast majority of the population, the majority opted for a remedial exemption in favour of the accused.
Since then, a number of lower courts have recognized the availability of remedial exemptions, although the judicial response has been far from uniform
across the country.25
The Supreme Court had a first real opportunity to deal with the issue of remedial exemptions in the case of Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board),26 dealing with a broad prohibition on public service employees participating in
partisan political activities. A majority found that the legislation violated freedom of expression and association and that it could not be justified under section 1 due to overbreadth. While all members of the majority agreed that the
provision had to be struck, three suggested without deciding that remedial
exemptions could be appropriate in some cases. 27 Wilson J., with the support of
L’Heureux-Dubé J., strongly objected. In their view, having found that a provision is overbroad and cannot be justified pursuant to section 1 of the Charter:
… the Court has no alternative but to strike the legislation down or, if the unconstitutional aspects are severable, to strike it down to the extent of its inconsistency
with the Constitution. I do not believe that it is open to the Court in these circumstances to create exemptions to the legislation (which, in my view, presupposes its
constitutional validity) and grant individual remedies under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In other words, it is not, in my opinion, open
to the Court to cure over-inclusiveness on a case by case basis leaving the legislation in its pristine over-inclusive form outstanding on the books.28

24

(1989), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 265 (B.C. C.A.).
The situation in the various provinces is canvassed by Peter Sankoff in “Constitutional
Exemptions: Myth or Reality?”, (2000) 11 N.J.C.L. 411, at 429-31. Remedial exemptions have so
far been clearly approved by the courts in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland, but rejected by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal. The Courts in Quebec and Ontario have
not resolved the matter in any conclusive way, although the Ontario Court of Appeal clearly did
endorse ancillary exemptions in the recent case of R. v. Parker (2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 481.
26
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 69.
27
Id., at 105.
28
Id., at 76-77.
25
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When Seaboyer29 reached the Supreme Court shortly thereafter, the issue
was back on the table. Reversing the majority of the Court of Appeal, the Court
struck down the rape-shield provision. McLachlin J., writing for a majority of
seven, was highly critical of remedial exemptions. Without ruling that exemptions would never be appropriate, her reasons were less than favourable. Noting
that, at least in this case, resort to remedial exemptions “would import into the
provision an element which the legislature specifically chose to exclude — the
discretion of the trial judge”, McLachlin J. (as she then was) added:
The doctrine, as applied in this case, delegates to the trial judge the task of determining when the legislation should not be applied. This amounts to saying that it
should not be applied when it should not be applied, unless some criterion outside
the Charter is found. On this reasoning, no law would be required to be struck
down under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982; the matter could always be resolved by the simple means of instructing trial judges not to apply laws when their
effect would be violative.30

While her criticism of exemptions was not an attempt to provide a fully articulated doctrine on the issue — which she clearly did not have to do — it is
telling that she passingly referred to cases such as Big M Drug Mart,31 Hunter
v. Southam Inc.32 and R. v. Smith33 in support of her position, indicating at least
a clear sense that remedial exemptions would not be easily reconcilable with
the path in which these cases had taken judicial review in Canada.
Two years later, in the highly controversial case of Rodriguez34 regarding assisted suicide, the issue of exemptions was again before the Court. The impugned Criminal Code provision was upheld by a 5-4 majority. In dissent,
however, Lamer C.J. considered the possibility of constitutional exemptions.
He concluded, like Wilson J. and L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Osborne, that remedial
exemptions should not be used as an alternative to striking down overly broad
statutory provisions. However, Lamer C.J. indicated that, where a Court strikes
down a statutory provision pursuant to section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
but decides to suspend the declaration of invalidity, exemptions could be issued
during the period of suspension.35 This is what we have referred to as “ancillary” exemptions.

29
30
31
32
33
34
35

R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577.
Id., at 628-29.
Supra, note 1.
Supra, note 14.
Supra, note 20.
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519.
Id., at 571-79.
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Except for a brief comment by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Rose (1998),36 the issue of exemptions was not again discussed by the Supreme Court until Corbiere (1999),37 where a residency requirement for voting under the Indian Act38
was unanimously found to offend the Charter. While all agreed that the provision had to be struck down and that a constitutional exemption would not be
appropriate, a majority nonetheless indicated in obiter that:
The remedy of constitutional exemption has been recognized in a very limited way
in this Court, to protect the interests of a party who has succeeded in having a legislative provision declared unconstitutional, where the declaration of invalidity has
been suspended; see Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at pp. 715-17;
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at p. 577.39

As for the broader use of remedial exemptions as an alternative to striking
down, it was approved by a four-judge minority, the strongest endorsement of
remedial exemptions by the Supreme Court to date. The majority, however,
expressly refrained from deciding the matter.
In the following years, a significant number of cases again raised the issue of
exemptive remedies. While the Supreme Court avoided in each case deciding
or even debating the question, it sent troubling signals that we may be going
down the path of remedial exemptions.
The first of these cases is R. v. Morrisey,40 upholding a minimum four-year
imprisonment for criminal negligence causing death with a firearm. Gonthier J.,
writing for five of the seven judges, found it “unnecessary to consider the
availability of constitutional exemptions” given the facts of the case. 41 However, Gonthier J. also restricted the use of reasonable hypotheticals in section
12 analysis to “imaginable circumstances which would commonly arise with a
degree of generality appropriate to the particular offence”. 42 Real life situations,
even if taken from reported cases, would not necessarily qualify unless they
reflected common occurrences. It is unclear to what extent this will lead to a
departure from previous practice regarding the use of reasonable hypotheticals
36
R. v. Rose, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262, at para. 66. Interestingly, L’Heureux-Dubé J. supported
the use of remedial exemptions, despite her previous position in Osborne, supra, note 26.
37
Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203.
38
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5.
39
Id., at para. 22. As pointed out by Peter Sankoff, the Supreme Court in Schachter had
clearly done no such thing as recognize constitutional exemptions. Sankoff, supra, note 25, at 429.
As to the Rodriguez decision, Lamer C.J.’s approval of ancillary exemption was not endorsed by
the majority, nor was it clearly endorsed by the other minority judges, although McLachlin J.
suggests otherwise in Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, at para. 179.
40
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 90.
41
Id., at para. 56.
42
Id., at para. 50.
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under section 12, or whether this could also affect the use of such hypotheticals
under section 1. If so, however, this could well make remedial exemptions
more appealing in situations where the Court has already upheld a particular
provision. In concurring reasons, Arbour J. rejected what she saw as an unduly
restrictive use of hypotheticals, yet nonetheless indicated that she would uphold
the general validity of the mandatory four-year sentence “while declining to
apply it in a future case if the minimum penalty is found to be grossly disproportionate for that future offender”43 — language which indisputably points to
remedial exemptions. It is noteworthy that Arbour J. was joined by McLachlin
C.J., despite her previously expressed disdain for exemptions in Seaboyer.
Most observers expected the Court to squarely deal with the issue in the high
profile case of R. v. Latimer, where the trial judge had granted an exemption
from the mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 10
years.44 The trial judge’s decision was overturned by the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal,45 not because exemptions could never be granted, but because it had
previously decided that an exemption was inappropriate on the facts of the
case.46 Having fully heard from the parties and interveners on the issue of exemptions — including a forceful objection by the Attorney General of Canada
— the Supreme Court rendered its unanimous judgment in January 2001.47 In a
short and cryptic statement, it held that “[w]here there is no violation of Mr.
Latimer’s s. 12 right there is no basis for granting a constitutional exemption”. 48
While it did not decide the existence of exemptive remedies, neither did the
Court express the usual reservations.
Less than 10 days later, in another high profile case dealing with child pornography, R. v. Sharpe,49 the same pattern emerged. The majority in Sharpe
found that the Criminal Code’s definition of child pornography was overly
broad in its application to the possession offence. Of particular concern was the
fact that the offence captured works of the imagination created by the accused
alone and kept for his or her personal use, as well as private recordings of
persons under the age of 18 engaged in lawful sexual activity. In discussing
possible remedies, McLachlin C.J. rejected the option of simply striking down
the provision and leaving the matter to Parliament. McLachlin C.J. wrote:

43

Id., at para. 66.
(1997), 121 C.C.C. (3d) 326 (Sask. Q.B.).
45
[1998] S.J. No. 731 (Sask. C.A.).
46
R. v. Latimer (1995), 99 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Sask. C.A.); rev’d. on other grounds at [1997] 1
S.C.R. 217.
47
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 3.
48
Id., at para. 87.
49
Supra, note 21.
44
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The difficulty with this remedy is that it nullifies a law that is valid in most of its
applications. Until Parliament can pass another law, the evil targeted goes unremedied. Why, one might well ask, should a law that is substantially constitutional be
struck down simply because the accused can point to a hypothetical application that
is far removed from his own case which might not be constitutional?50

Such a conundrum, of course, arises only if remedial exemptions are not
available to cure marginal infirmities in the statute. Thus, while in that case
exemptions were not argued, McLachlin C.J., for the majority, nonetheless
wrote:
Yet another alternative might be to uphold the law on the basis that it is constitutionally valid in the vast majority of its applications and stipulate that if and when
unconstitutional applications arise, the accused may seek a constitutional exemption. Ross, who concludes that s. 163.1(4) is constitutional in most but not all of its
applications, recommends this remedy: Ross, supra, at p. 58.51

Again, no caution was expressed beyond the use of the conditional “might”.
The majority simply decided that an exemption was not necessary in that case
and that the appropriate remedy was to “read in” certain exceptions to the
provision in order to cure its overbreadth.
Interestingly, however, the paragraph dealing with the possibility of remedial
exemptions is preceded by one in which McLachlin C.J. states:
Another alternative might be to hold that the law as it applies to the case at bar is
valid, declining to find it unconstitutional on the basis of a hypothetical scenario
that has not yet arisen. In the United States, courts have frequently declined to
strike out laws on the basis of hypothetical situations not before the court, although
less so in First Amendment (free expression) cases. While the Canadian jurisprudence on the question is young, thus far it suggests that laws may be struck out on
the basis of hypothetical situations, provided they are “reasonable”.52

This paragraph is certainly awkward at this stage of the reasons in a discussion of remedies, since it suggests that the entire approach under which the case
was litigated and adjudicated may not be the appropriate one at all, given that
the problematic applications of the provision (i.e., works of the imagination and
recordings of lawful sexual activities) had no connection to the facts of the
case. Nonetheless, it is telling that this questioning of the use of reasonable
hypotheticals comes into play immediately prior to the suggestion that remedial
exemptions may be an available option. While the court does not make any
explicit connection between the two, the juxtaposition clearly suggests the
50
51
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Id., at para. 111.
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Court’s awareness of the relationship between remedial exemptions and the
scope of judicial review. Indeed, the statement that “[w]hile the Canadian
jurisprudence on the question is young, thus far it suggests that laws may be
struck out on the basis of hypothetical situations” appears to suggest an overture towards revisiting the use of reasonable hypotheticals in Charter adjudication.
Whether the Supreme Court will want to recognize remedial exemptions in
the future will depend in part on its willingness to reconsider the approach
developed in the early years of the Charter regarding issues of standing, the use
of reasonable hypotheticals and the scope of its mandate under section 52 of the
Constitution. However, this choice should also be informed by considerations
which relate to the implications of constitutional exemptions for the rule of law.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW
The objections that we wish to formulate here reflect the belief that constitutional exemptions would imply an important deterioration of the “rule of law”
as we have come to understand it and cause significant problems, not just theoretical
but
also
practical,
in
particular with respect to the application of the criminal law. Our purpose here
is not to attempt to formulate a coherent doctrine of the rule of law, which
would be a daunting enterprise in itself, but rather to point to a “cluster” of
concepts
or
ideals
traditionally
associated with the rule of law or which have become so in more recent times,
and which are directly relevant to the debate on constitutional exemptions:
ideas such as “equality before the law”, certainty, public order and civil disobedience, or — more recently — the concept of a “constitutional dialogue” between the courts and the legislatures.
1. The Rule of Law, Certainty and the Importance of the Generic
Perhaps the main argument in support of constitutional exemptions is the
flexibility that exemptions provide when courts are dealing with difficult constitutional issues in particular fact situations. While undeniable, the benefits of
flexibility come at a cost. As expressed by Oonagh Fitzgerald, the recognition
of constitutional exemptions:
… seems to embody an approach seriously at odds with traditional notions of the
rule of law. Recognizing constitutional exemptions undermines the certainty of
law, increases the need for litigation to determine their application to specific cases,
and gives the courts almost unlimited discretionary power to make and unmake
positive laws as they apply to different people. It is, perhaps, a remedy from Pan-
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dora’s box: if we reach in to take it in what seems an appropriate case, who knows
what other problems will be unleashed.53

According to Lon Fuller’s classic exposé, law is “the enterprise of subjecting
human conduct to the governance of rules”.54 Fuller writes:
Surely, the very essence of the Rule of Law is that in acting upon the citizen (by
putting him in jail, for example, or declaring invalid a deed under which he claims
title to property) a government will faithfully apply rules previously declared as
those to be followed by the citizen and as being determinative of his rights and duties. If the Rule of Law does not mean this, it means nothing. Applying rules faithfully implies, in turn, that rules will take the form of general declarations; it would
make little sense, for example, if the government were today to enact a special law
whereby Jones should be put in jail and then tomorrow were “faithfully” to follow
this “rule” by actually putting him in jail. Furthermore, if the law is intended to
permit a man to conduct his own affairs subject to an obligation to observe certain
restraints imposed by superior authority, this implies that he will not be told at each
turn what to do; law furnishes a baseline for self-directed action, not a detailed set
of instructions for accomplishing specific objectives. 55

It is thus broadly understood that the rule of law embodies an ideal-type legal order characterized by certain qualities, which typically include, as in Lon
Fuller’s exposé, a desire for clarity, generality and prospectivity. Yet, all three
of these virtues are compromised by the use of constitutional exemptions.
Clarity and certainty in law are of course never achieved, only facilitated.
The idea is not absolute certainty, as recognized by the Supreme Court in numerous
instances,
but
a
requirement
that
lawmakers provide as much guidance as is reasonably possible in order to
permit a reasoned debate. This requirement, which applies equally to courts, is
essential to sustain the claim that ours is “a government of laws and not of
men.” In adjudicating Charter cases, it is fundamental that courts provide citizens, governments and legislatures sufficient guidance to guide their actions.
This is true not only with respect to the interpretation of the Charter’s substantive protections, but also with respect to the remedies applied in curing constitutional infirmities in statutes, and the result of these remedial actions by the
courts on the state of the law.
While judicial interpretation is by no means an exact science, a decision is
reasonable, as opposed to capricious, if it reflects (a) the application of recognizable principles to categories of facts based on a demonstration of relevance,
as well as (b) the linking of the facts of the case to the same categories. The
53
54
55

Fitzgerald, Understanding Charter Remedies: A Practitioner’s Guide, (1994), at 5-27.
Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev. ed., 1969), at 96.
Id., at 209-10.
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ability to convincingly abstract from the particulars of a case to generic categories that are shown to be relevant to the legal principles is essential to legitimate
judicial decision-making under the rule of law. It is essential, in other words, to
the judges’ “interpretative claim” — the claim, which is inherent to the rule of
law, that the judge is not deciding by fiat, but rather that he or she is interpreting the law as something distinct from simply exerting his or her personal will.
Competent judicial decision-making thus implies references to generic or abstract categories that serve both to ground the decision’s legitimacy in law and,
in cases where constitutional infirmities are identified, to forecast potential
avenues for remedying those infirmities. Exemptions are problematic in that
they allow the courts to alter the state of the law, yet avoid the essential task of
identifying the factors and principles that provide a more or less clear “generic”
sense of the law’s future application. Hence McLachlin J.’s criticism of exemptions in Seaboyer — that exemptions delegate “to the trial judge the task of
determining when the legislation should not be applied. This amounts to saying
that it should not be applied when it should not be applied, unless some criterion outside the Charter is found”.56 While it may sometimes appear convenient
to dispose of a case without having to sketch out a blueprint for the future,
doing so creates difficulties that should not be underestimated.
These difficulties are by no means limited to remedial exemptions but also
exist with respect to the more limited “ancillary” exemptions that may accompany the suspension of a declaration of invalidity.
This may be illustrated by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in R. v.
Guignard,57 where the Court struck down a municipal offence regarding the
erection of advertising signs outside an industrial zone on the basis that it restricted freedom of expression in a manner that was overly broad. In cursory
fashion, the Court suspended the declaration of invalidity and acquitted the
accused. While there was no discussion of the matter, this was in effect an
ancillary exemption.58 Of particular concern to the Court in Guignard was the
fact that the by-law defined an advertising sign as a:

56

Supra, note 29.
2002 SCC 14 (February 21, 2002).
58
In fact, Guignard seems to be the first case where an ancillary exemption has been granted
by the Supreme Court of Canada (such an exemption was granted by the Ontario Court of Appeal
in R. v. Parker, supra, note 25). It may be noted, however, that in R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R.
117, the Supreme Court suspended for six months the operation of its previous ruling in the same
case ([1997] 2 S.C.R. 13) regarding the need for a warrant for entering into a dwelling place to
make an arrest, while at the same time giving the accused full benefit of the ruling. However, the
ruling did not implicate any existing statutory provision and, as such, does not qualify as an ancillary exemption as defined here.
57
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Sign indicating at least the name of a company and drawing attention to a business,
a product, a service or an entertainment carried on, sold or offered other than the
property on which it is placed.59

On a literal reading, this definition captured consumer “counter-advertising”,
as illustrated by the accused’s posted expression of dissatisfaction with an
insurance company. In striking down the provision, the Court wrote:
The only appropriate remedy in this case is a declaration that the provisions of the
municipal by-law the appellant has challenged are invalid. Because of the considerable overlap between the definitions and the provision imposing the ban, the declaration of nullity must apply to both the definition and the ban itself. That is the
relief that follows from the type of challenge that was brought. A solution that applied solely and personally to the appellant would not satisfactorily resolve the legal problem before us. However, given the importance of the zoning by-law in
municipal land use planning and the risk of creating acquired rights, during a period in which there was a legal vacuum, which could be set up against a subsequent
by-law, that relief must be tempered by suspending the declaration of invalidity for
a period of six months, to give the municipality an opportunity to revise its by-law.
It will no doubt be in the respondent’s interests to rethink the definition of “advertising sign”, in particular, and more clearly identify the real objectives of the bans
imposed. The appellant must therefore be acquitted of the charge against him. 60

Leaving aside the Court’s passing reference to an individualized remedy, the
suspension of a declaration of invalidity relating to an offence should raise an
eyebrow. Not that it is entirely unprecedented. It was done at least once before
in the Manitoba Language Rights Reference,61 but in a context where the consequences of not suspending the declaration of invalidity were clearly more
dramatic than here. In that case, the failure to suspend would have led to the
obliteration of all provincial offences, including offences that are essential to
public safety. The concern in Guignard is of a different order. The concern is
with the potential creation of acquired rights to commercial advertisement in
Saint-Hyacinthe during the period between the decision and the adoption of a
new by-law. Assuming that one can properly acquire rights in this context,
there is no doubt that this is something which can be fixed by legislation. If
such a concern is of sufficient importance to warrant the suspension of the
declaration of invalidity, it is difficult to see when a suspension would not be
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Supra, note 57, at para. 12 (Supreme Court’s translation of the Règlement d'urbanisme no
1200 de la Ville de Saint-Hyacinthe, s. 2.2.4).
60
Id., at para. 32.
61
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ordered, even where the constitutionally defective provision is a criminal offence.62
While the power of courts to temporarily suspend the effect of a declaration
of invalidity is welcome and has indeed become a critical tool in what has been
described as the “dialogue” between courts and legislators (a matter which is
addressed further below), suspensions in connection to invalid offences constitute a special category that require considerable caution. Granting a suspension
makes it difficult to resist granting the accused an ancillary exemption with
respect to the successfully challenged offence and raises the more difficult
question of who, other than the accused, may benefit from such an exemption
during the period of suspension. This issue was raised by McLachlin J. (as she
then
was)
in
Miron
v.
Trudel,63
a
non-criminal case dealing with the definition of “spouse” under the Ontario
Insurance Act.64 A majority of the Court found that the exclusion of unmarried
couples violated section 15(1) of the Charter and held that the word “spouse”
should be read as including common law spouses. In rejecting the possibility of
a suspension combined with an ancillary exemption, she wrote:
Assuming the Court were inclined to grant the appellants an exemption from the
1980 legislation and insurance policy provisions, the question remains of how it
could do so without creating further inequities between the appellants and others in
their situation who have been denied benefits. To avoid this, any constitutional exemption would have to be extended to all similar families. This in turn would require formulation of general criteria of eligibility, thus involving the court in the
very activity which would have led it to eschew “reading up” the 1980 statute in
62

In Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, the issue was addressed by Lamer C.J. who
indicated that (p. 719):
Temporarily suspending the declaration of invalidity to give Parliament or the provincial legislature in question an opportunity to bring the impugned legislation or legislative
provision into line with its constitutional obligations will be warranted even where striking
down has been deemed the most appropriate option on the basis of one of the above criteria
if:
A. striking down the legislation without enacting something in its place would pose a
danger to the public;
B. striking down the legislation without enacting something in its place would threaten
the rule of law; or,
C. the legislation was deemed unconstitutional because of underinclusiveness rather than
overbreadth, and therefore striking down the legislation would result in the deprivation
of benefits from deserving persons without thereby benefitting the individual whose
rights have been violated.
The situation in Guignard clearly does not fall within any of the three situations identified
in Schachter.
63
Supra, note 39.
64
R.S.O. 1980, c. 218.
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conformity with the terms legislated in 1990. Yet to deny such persons a remedy
would be to perpetuate the effects of a discrimination which the Court has found to
violate the Charter when the obvious remedy — the payment of the benefits that
should have been paid — remains available [emphasis added].65

In the Manitoba Language Rights Reference,66 the suspension of the declaration of invalidity operated equally for all in that, during the period of suspension, all persons continued to be subject to the province’s laws, including
provincial offences.67 Here, in Guignard, the Court suspended the declaration
of invalidity, yet acquitted the accused not only without discussion but as if this
were a matter of logical or legal necessity (“The appellant must therefore be
acquitted of the charge against him.”) — without inquiring as to the implications for other individuals. It may be inferred from the reasoning of the Court in
Guignard that the by-law should not apply to anyone engaged in noncommercial expression but that it should otherwise be applicable. If so, however, one is left to wonder why the definition was not simply “read-down” in
this way, leaving the provision intact for all of its permissible applications. But
if this assessment of the decision’s implications is wrong (and the fact that the
impugned rule was struck rather than simply read down suggests that it is indeed an incorrect assessment), then what, one may ask, is the state of the law
on signs during the period of suspension?
If anything is clear, it seems obvious that the preference for certainty and the
generic under the rule of law requires that situations such as these should be
avoided. Even if we accept that ancillary exemptions have now been recognized by the Supreme Court, their application to defective offence provisions,
whether in the Criminal Code or in a regulatory context, requires considerable
caution and should occur only exceptionally.
The use of remedial exemptions in the criminal law is equally problematic, if
not more so. Remedial exemptions have most often been considered in relation
to mandatory minimum sentences in the Criminal Code. This was the case, for
example in Chief 68 (where an exemption was granted), regarding a firearm
prohibition, as well as in Morrisey69 and Latimer70 (where the issue was not
decided), regarding minimum terms of imprisonment. Where Parliament imposes a mandatory minimum sentence, it explicitly chooses to remove judicial
discretion in favour of certainty and deterrence. In this context, the use of re-
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medial exemptions on a case-by-case basis directly frustrates Parliament’s
intent, just as much as and arguably more so than would the use of “reading in”
to exclude delineated categories. As Peter Sankoff writes:
In Schachter, Lamer C.J. discussed the “reading in” remedy and stated that “the
purpose of [the remedy] is to be as faithful as possible within the requirements of
the Constitution to the scheme enacted by the Legislature.” In cases involving
mandatory minimum sentences or other provisions deliberately omitting judicial
discretion, it is arguable that an exemption will never be “as faithful as possible” to
the scheme enacted. Obviously, one of the main purposes for enacting mandatory
legislation was to establish certainty.71

By removing both certainty and deterrence, remedial exemptions from mandatory minimum sentences distort the legislative scheme and fail to satisfy the
Schachter test for appropriate remedies.
Where the impugned provision relates to the trial process, as in Seaboyer72 or
Rose,73 the use of exemptions is equally difficult to justify. Here too, judicial
deference does not support exemptions from mandatory rules of evidence or
procedure. If “reading out” or “reading in” exempt categories is not appropriate
because it would overly interfere with the legislative function, it is difficult to
see how doing the same on a case-by-case basis is any more appropriate. The
provision should be struck down. Alternatively, a court may exclude an element
of evidence or even perhaps decide to simply stay the proceedings against the
accused if the application of the rule compromises trial fairness. 74 Parliament
can then decide whether to amend the rules to introduce an element of
flexibility or whether to keep it intact, even if that means losing some cases. In
a successful Rowbotham75 application, failure by the government to provide
funded counsel for the defence will not lead to the invalidation of the legal aid
regime but, rather, to the staying of the proceedings. 76
Finally, where it is the offence itself that suffers from some constitutional
infirmity, the use of remedial exemptions is even more problematic. Related to
the idea of the “generic” and equally important to the rule of law is the concept
that ours is not a system of “personalized law”. Unless they can be crafted by
reference to an abstract class of persons (in which case we cease to be in the
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realm of constitutional exemptions and move towards “reading in” or “reading
down”) remedial exemptions are the judicial equivalent of private Acts.
The difficult reconciliation of private Acts with the rule of law is nowhere
more apparent than in the area of criminal law. The abhorrence of constitutional
democracies to what has become known in the Anglo-Saxon world as “bills of
attainder” requires little explanation. 77 Bills of attainder, which were used in
order to single out individuals for punishment, are offensive not merely because
they usurp the judicial function,78 but because they reduce the rule of law to a
purely formal process of individual designation and obviate what is ultimately
the essence of law: the expression of rules governing generic categories of facts
and conduct. But if remedial exemptions are little more than bills of attainder in
reverse, it is unclear why exemptions should be looked at more favourably.
One may argue that bills of attainder are fundamentally unprincipled and that
they reflect mere political expediency, whereas exemptions result from the
application of constitutional principles. The distinction, however, is not a necessary
one.
Exemptions
are
distinguishable from “reverse bills of attainder” only to the extent that the
accused’s conduct can be linked to a greater or more abstract category that is
demonstrated by the court to be constitutionally significant. If such a demonstration is possible, however, constitutional exemptions arguably become unnecessary.
This is not to deny the practical convenience of remedial exemptions for the
judge who is faced with a hard case and the challenges that the unavailability of
remedial exemptions creates. But the experience to date demonstrates that our
courts have been up to the task. Looking back at the first 20 years of the Charter, it is hard to find a compelling argument to support the recognition of remedial exemptions and the move towards an American approach of case-by-case
application of the Charter.
In searching for flexible remedies, a case that is worthy of some attention is
the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Sharpe79 dealing, as previously indicated,
with the Criminal Code offence of possessing child pornography. In crafting a
Charter remedy, the majority indicated that a constitutional exemption was not
appropriate and proceeded instead on the basis of what it described as “reading
in” two exceptions that would operate as defences in addition to the defences
77

U.S. Const. art I, § 9, cl. 3, provides that: “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law will
be passed.”
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already provided in the Code. The interesting fact about the remedy, however,
is that the “read in” exceptions were not couched in statutory form or “canonical” language. Indeed, the two exceptions are described on several occasions in
the judgment (five, to be precise) using different language, sometimes (but not
always) accompanied by significant qualifications.
Relying on the language used in the majority’s conclusion, the second exception would cover “any visual recording, created by or depicting the accused,
provided it does not depict unlawful sexual activity and is held by the accused
exclusively for private use”.80 A literal application of this exception would
suggest that an adult taking a pornographic picture of a five year old child
would qualify for the exception since in this example there is no “unlawful
sexual activity” taking place. Clearly, this was not the majority’s intent, as one
would gather from reading paragraph 116:
The second category would protect auto-depictions, such as photographs taken by a
child or adolescent of him- or herself alone, kept in strict privacy and intended for
personal use only. It would also extend to protect the recording of lawful sexual activity, provided certain conditions were met. The person possessing the recording
must have personally recorded or participated in the sexual activity in question.
That activity must not be unlawful, thus ensuring the consent of all parties, and
precluding the exploitation or abuse of children. All parties must also have consented to the creation of the record. The recording must be kept in strict privacy by
the person in possession, and intended exclusively for private use by the creator
and the persons depicted therein. Thus, for example, a teenage couple would not
fall within the law’s purview for creating and keeping sexually explicit pictures featuring each other alone, or together engaged in lawful sexual activity, provided
these pictures were created together and shared only with one another [emphasis
added].

Material falling within the first exception (works of the imagination) could
also raise difficult issues. For example, what about a situation where someone,
using a computer, transforms an ordinary picture of a real child into a pornographic image? Is such a work “created by the accused alone”?
The possibility of such difficulties was readily acknowledged by McLachlin
J. who, for the majority, wrote:
I recognize that questions may arise in the application of the excepted categories.
However, the same may be said for s. 163.1 as drafted. It will be for the courts to
consider precise questions of interpretation if and when they arise, bearing in mind
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Parliament’s fundamental object: to ban possession of child pornography which
raises a reasoned apprehension of harm to children.81

The interesting aspect of the remedy in Sharpe is that, in the absence of fixed
language, the “read in” exceptions operate in a manner that is more analogous
to a common law defence, the precise meaning of which is “discovered” and
evolves over time through the course of adjudication.
While allowing for flexibility, the remedy is one that provides substantial
guidance (to courts, individuals and Parliament) by delineating, even if not with
absolute precision, classes of persons who could benefit from the exceptions. In
this way, the remedy is arguably consistent with the rule of law’s requirement
of generality and clarity. Although Sharpe is an exceptional case and the remedy not one that we would expect to see on a regular basis, it illustrates the
capacity of courts to craft flexible remedies that avoid the grave problems
associated with constitutional exemptions and their detrimental impact on the
rule of law in Canada.
2. The Rule of Law and the Dialogue Between the Courts and the
Legislatures
The ideal of a “government of laws and not of men” is as appealing as it is
conceptually challenging. If there is no “god’s eye view” from which the meaning of laws and constitutions can be objectively ascertained, how can we claim
to live under the rule of law and not merely the rule of judges? Contemporary
hermeneutics use the metaphor of a “dialogue” between the text and the reader
to explain the interpretive process.82 This dialogical process is a never-ending
one, where the meaning we give to texts is in a constant state of flux due to the
ever-changing landscape that constitutes the interpretive horizon.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the idea of a “dialogue” has also gained popularity
in recent years to describe the relationship between courts and legislatures.
Under this model, the legal and constitutional landscape is progressively defined as each institution responds in turn to the other’s view of what is permissible under the Charter.83
81
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82

(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Ifs and Buts in Charter Adjudication

397

In the dialogue model, Parliament must turn its mind to the Constitution and
provide its own interpretation of the limits imposed by the Charter. It must act
in a principled way and be concerned not only with how a law may “in most
cases” affect the rights of individuals, or with how the law will “usually” operate. It cannot rely on prosecutorial discretion and assume that people who
should not be interfered with will simply be left alone. 84 Parliament must strive
to ensure that the legislation as drafted complies with the Charter, giving its
own view of the Constitution’s requirements and taking into account what the
courts have previously said. Like the courts, it must turn its mind to the law’s
possible applications and ensure that it is appropriate in all reasonably foreseeable cases. This requires vigilance. It is not an easy task and while it is a challenge well worth taking, courts will necessarily disagree in some cases with
Parliament’s assessment.
The courts’ interpretation of the Charter will, in turn, be influenced not only
by previous cases but also by the legislation that is brought before them. Just as
they look at the laws before them in light of the Charter, their view of the Charter is informed by Parliament’s attempt to provide a legal framework for individual behavior and social interactions in response to often difficult and
complex problems. Where they find that acts of Parliament are not reconcilable
with the Charter, their role is to intervene and, in so doing, attempt to provide
guidance while at the same time remaining deferential to the legislative function.
In almost every case there will be room for Parliament or the legislatures to
respond. Parliament may follow the court’s suggestions or come up with alternative solutions. Ultimately, Parliament may decide to resort to the “notwithstanding” clause found in section 33 of the Charter.
The problem with remedial exemptions is that they thwart this constitutional
dialogue at every stage.
Remedial exemptions send the message to legislatures that they need not
worry all that much, provided that the laws are “generally OK”. Unless a law is
fundamentally irreconcilable with the Charter it should stand, leaving for another day the task of resolving problems as they arise, on a case-by-case basis.
Exemptions are, in practice, an invitation for sloppy legislation.

discussion, it is sufficient to focus on the institutional dialogue between the legislative branch and
the judiciary, even though such a focus may not be entirely adequate to account for the behavior of
both branches. The dialogue model seems to have emerged in both American and Canadian legal
literature in the 1990’s. See, for example, Fitzgerald, supra, note 53, at 1-1 to 1-8.
84
This point is well established in Charter jurisprudence. As expressed by Cory J. (for the
majority) in R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013, at 1063: “It has long been recognized that the holder
of a constitutional right need not rely upon the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and restraint for
the protection of the right.” Also see R. v. Smith, supra, note 20, at 1078.
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Their acceptance as a Charter remedy to ill-crafted legislation leads or contributes to what has been described elsewhere as a problem of “democratic
debilitation”, which “occurs when the public and their democratically elected
representatives cease to formulate and discuss constitutional norms, instead
relying on the courts to address constitutional problems”. 85 The occasional
temptation to rely on courts to resolve controversial legal or social issues may
perhaps be inevitable. However, recognizing remedial exemptions carries the
risk of a much more profound change in the way legislators take into account
Charter rights in developing legislation. Once this type of remedy becomes
accepted, it is likely inevitable that courts will be more reluctant to strike down
legislation based on hypothetical situations, as suggested by McLachlin C.J.’s
comments in Sharpe. The legacy of early landmark cases such as Big M Drug
Mart has been a significant disciplining effect on legislators who must provide
rules that adequately take into consideration their effect on various segments of
society and differently situated individuals. Perhaps this legacy is one that is
more apparent to those who are involved in the inner workings of the legislative
process, but it is one that the courts should be reluctant to jeopardize by opening the door to remedial exemptions.
In granting a remedial exemption but leaving the law intact, courts also send
the troubling message that individuals may in certain circumstances have the
right to disregard valid law and that civil disobedience may be perfectly justifiable, not just morally, but also legally under the Constitution. Remedial exemptions relieve the courts of having to engage with the legislatures in defining
appropriate lines of conduct. While they conveniently satisfy the claims of the
litigant in a particular case, they provide little comfort for other individuals who
may (or may not) be caught by the overbreadth of the legislation, thereby creating a chilling effect. In other words, exemptions are also an invitation for
sloppy adjudication.
More fundamentally, the use of remedial exemptions effectively interrupts
the dialogue between the courts and legislatures. Of the four features identified
by Peter Hogg and Alison Bushell in their oft-cited paper on the Charter dialogue, the first is the existence of the notwithstanding clause in section 33,
which allows Parliament or the legislatures to override a court’s decision. 86
Leaving aside the issue of the legitimacy of resorting to section 33, the question
raised by the use of remedial exemptions as an alternative to striking down is,
what legislative form would a response based on section 33 take? In principle,
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Tushnet, “Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty”, (1995) 94 Mich. L. Rev. 245, at 271.
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Hogg & Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps
the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)”, (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75, at 82.

(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Ifs and Buts in Charter Adjudication

399

the law could be simply re-enacted notwithstanding the Charter so as to ensure
its universal application. In practice, however, this makes for an awkward
response. The law, after all, is valid.
In the vast majority of cases, however, Parliament or the legislatures will not
want to use section 33 but rather fix the constitutional defect in the provision.
But, by upholding the law and refusing to apply it to a particular litigant without identifying a class of situations where the rule should not operate, legislators are given little guidance that could assist in recasting the provision in a
way that better complies with the Charter, and even less incentive to do so.

III. CONCLUSION
In the early years of the Charter’s application, judicial review in Canada has
taken a path that is significantly different than in the United States. Permissive
standing rules and broad interpretation of the Charter’s guarantees have allowed for rigorous judicial review, disciplined the legislative function and
helped provide everyone with clearer legal guidance. There should be no ambiguity about the message of this paper: constitutional exemptions are a significant threat to this legacy and are, in many ways, detrimental to the rule of law.
We have so far done without remedial exemptions and should continue to do
so.
Whether the Supreme Court will stay clear of remedial exemptions and only
exceptionally grant ancillary exemptions is another question. Recent jurisprudence at least suggests that it is warming up to the idea of granting constitutional exemptions. And, in fairness, the matter is hardly a simple one. On the
one hand, even if we are to continue with generous rules of standing and the
use of reasonable hypotheticals in Charter adjudication, how does a court deal
with real fact situations that are marginal? If the law is held to be valid as it
applies to reasonable hypothetical situations, should it be struck down in a
subsequent “marginal” case?87 On the other hand, can the Charter require that
legislation be crafted in a way that is perfectly tailored to each and every person’s
unique
situation? 88

87

This issue is discussed in a forthcoming publication by Sankoff, “Constitutional Exemptions: An Ongoing Problem Requiring A Swift Resolution”.
88
As Sopinka J. indicated in R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, at 504-5, “[i]n determining
whether less intrusive legislation may be imagined, this Court stressed in the Prostitution Reference, supra, that it is not necessary that the legislative scheme be the ‘perfect’ scheme […]”.
Similarly, in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, McLachlin
J. (as she then was) wrote in discussing s. 1 (para. 160):
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Remedies are not something that can be considered separately from the
rights that they serve to uphold. In searching for a perfect response to individual claims, the danger to do more harm than good is a very real one.

As the second step in the proportionality analysis, the government must show that the
measures at issue impair the right of free expression as little as reasonably possible in order to
achieve the legislative objective. The impairment must be “minimal”, that is, the law must be
carefully tailored so that rights are impaired no more than necessary. The tailoring process
seldom admits of perfection and the courts must accord some leeway to the legislator. If the
law falls within a range of reasonable alternatives, the courts will not find it overbroad merely
because they can conceive of an alternative which might better tailor objective to infringement… .
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